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Exam 1: Weeks 1 to 7Week 9: 4th Amendment (Search & Seizure)
9.1 Material on the 4th Amendment
- 4th Amendment Video: Click here
- Dolly Map got the illegal Search & Search laws revised (Click the following link for the full pdf)
The Fourth Amendment and Major Cases
The Fourth Amendment is the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses… against unreasonable searches, and is an important right.
Americans want to feel safe in their homes and do not want police constantly involved in their daily lives. On the other hand, Americans want to be safe from crime and terrorism. There is a difficult and controversial balance between these two perspectives, and there has been since this nation was founded. Let us look at three important cases dealing with Fourth Amendment issues.
What Happens When a Search violates the 4th Amendment
The exclusionary rule
If, upon review, a court finds that an unreasonable search occurred, any evidence seized as a result of it cannot be used as direct evidence against the defendant in a criminal prosecution. This principle, established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1961, has come to be known as the exclusionary rule.
- Against the rule: Many commentators criticize the exclusionary rule on the ground that it unfairly "lets the criminal go free because the constable has erred."
- For the rule: Supporters argue that excluding illegally seized evidence is necessary to deter police from conducting illegal searches. According to this deterrence argument, the police are less likely to conduct improper searches if the resulting evidence can't be used to convict the defendant.
Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
- Not only is evidence that's the product of an illegal search generally inadmissible in court, but so too is additional evidence that derived from the initial evidence. This principle is colorfully known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
- The "tree" is the evidence that the police illegally seize in the first place; the "fruit" is the second-generation product of the illegally seized evidence. Both tree and fruit are typically inadmissible at trial.
Not always end of story.
Some defendants believe that if they can show that a search was illegal, the case must be dismissed. Not true. If a prosecutor has enough other evidence to prove the defendant guilty, the case can continue. Also, the illegally seized evidence can generally be considered by a judge when deciding on an appropriate sentence following conviction and admitted in civil and deportation cases. In some circumstances, a prosecutor can use such evidence to impeach (attack the credibility of) a defendant who testifies at trial.
Major Cases
1. Mapp v. Ohio
- In the 1961 case, Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court decided that any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would be deemed inadmissible in court.
- Dollree Mapp was suspected of hiding a bombing suspect. Police knocked at her door, but she did not answer. Eventually, police forced their way in. Once they breached the doorway, Dollree demanded to see their warrant. She placed the warrant in her bra. The warrant was destroyed when the police tried to retrieve it.
- The police found pornography in the home (a crime in that archaic time) and charged Mapp with possession of lewd material.
- The prosecuting attorney did NOT have the warrant to present as evidence.
- Ohio convicted Mapp, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and ruled any evidence gathered in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible.
2. Katz v. United States
The 1967 Supreme Court case Katz v. United States is another major 4th amendment case.
- Charles Katz sent illegal betting wagers through a public pay phone booth. The FBI recorded his calls, and the recordings were used as evidence against him in trial.
- The Supreme Court decided that this evidence was inadmissible as Katz believed he has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when making the phone calls.
- The Supreme Court dictated that any conversation made with a reasonable expectation of privacy is protected under the Fourth Amendment and that wiretapping constitutes a search.
3. Terry v. Ohio
- Terry v. Ohio is a 1968 Supreme Court decision upholding “stop-and-frisk” policing. John Terry and two other men were walking around suspiciously in front of a building.
- A police officer approached them and found a pistol in Terry’s pocket. He ordered the three men inside the building and patted them down. He found a weapon on one of the other men.
- Terry and his armed friend were charged with carrying concealed weapons.
- The Supreme Court ruled that Terry’s search was reasonable and justified by the need to protect “the police and others nearby.”
- Since this case, there have been many other cases addressing the issue of when it is okay for an officer to search a suspect.
Summary adapted from Cornell University Law School, Nolo.com, and debruinlawfirm.com
California v. Ciraolo
476 U.S. 207 (1986)
- Police in Santa Clara, California received an anonymous tip that Dante Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard, which was enclosed by two fences and shielded from view at ground level.
- Using a private airplane, the police flew over his house at an altitude of 1,000 feet and readily identified marijuana plants growing in the yard. After obtaining a search warrant, the marijuana plants were seized.
- The California trial court denied Ciraolo’s motion to suppress the evidence of the search, but the California Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that the warrantless aerial observation violated the Fourth Amendment.
- This case illustrates how the Court determines constitutionality not based on the text, intent, or history of the Constitution, but on what “society is willing to recognize” as a reasonable expectation of privacy.
- CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth Amendment is violated by aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home.
I
On September 2, 1982, Santa Clara Police received an anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in respondent's backyard. Police were unable to observe the contents of respondent's yard from ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard. Later that day, Officer Shutz, who was assigned to investigate, secured a private plane and flew over respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet, within navigable airspace; he was accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. Both officers were trained in marijuana identification. From the overflight, the officers readily identified marijuana plants 8 feet to 10 feet in height growing in a 15- by 25-foot plot in respondent's yard; they photographed the area with a standard 35mm camera.
On September 8, 1982, Officer Shutz obtained a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit describing the anonymous tip and their observations; a photograph depicting respondent's house, the backyard, and neighboring homes was attached to the affidavit as an exhibit. The warrant was executed the next day, and 73 plants were seized; it is not disputed that these were marijuana.
After the trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the evidence of the search, respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeal reversed, however, on the ground that the warrantless aerial observation of respondent's yard which led to the issuance of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment...
II
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable? See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 442 U. S. 740 (1979)
Clearly -- and understandably -- respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits. However, we need not address that issue, for the State has not challenged the finding of the California Court of Appeal that respondent had such an expectation. It can reasonably be assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop from at least street-level views…
Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus. Whether respondent therefore manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard, or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances. Respondent appears to challenge the authority of government to observe his activity from any vantage point or place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and not the result of a casual, accidental observation.
We turn, therefore, to the second inquiry under Katz, i.e., whether that expectation is reasonable. In pursuing this inquiry, we must keep in mind that "[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private' activity," but instead "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver, supra, at 466 U. S. 181-183.
Respondent argues that, because his yard was in the curtilage of his home, no governmental aerial observation is permissible under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant. The history and genesis of the curtilage doctrine are instructive.
"At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.'" Oliver, supra, at Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States) The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened. The claimed area here was immediately adjacent to a suburban home, surrounded by high double fences. This close nexus to the home would appear to encompass this small area within the curtilage. Accepting, as the State does, that this yard and its crop fall within the curtilage, the question remains whether naked-eye observation of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 feet violates an expectation of privacy that is reasonable.
Oliver v. United States — 466 U.S. 170 (1984) — See Wikipedia | Justia
A USSC decision relating to the open fields’ doctrine limiting the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Boyd v. United States — 116 U.S. 616 (1886) — See: Wikipedia | Justia
A decision by the USSC, in which the Court held that “a search and seizure [was] equivalent [to] a compulsory production of a man's private papers” and that the search was “an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible…
The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place within public navigable airspace, see 49 U.S.C. App. § 1304, in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this point, they were able to observe plants readily discernible to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable, and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor…
Reversed.
JUSTICES POWELL, BRENNAN, MARSHALL, AND BLACKMUN dissented on the basis that one does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a backyard, which is why it is fenced, and there is no expectation that typical air travelers will be able to catch more than a “fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse” of the landscape and buildings.
Week 10: Discrimination: 14th Amendment Equal Protection
- Video: 14th Amendment (Equal Protection): Click here
- Video: Brown v. Board of Education: Click here
- Video: Mendez v. Westminster (CA school deseg. case): Click here
- Video: Little Rock Nine (School seg.): Click here
- Video: Yick Wo and the Equal Protection Clause: Click here
- Video: Reporting on Love 1967: Click here
10.1 Levels of Scrutiny
Test | Application | Standard Use |
Strict scrutiny | Race, ethnicity | Suspect category — assumed unconstitutional in the absence of an overwhelming justification |
Intermediate scrutiny | Gender | Almost suspect category — assumed unconstitutional unless the law serves a clearly compelling and justified purpose |
Reasonable basis | Other categories (such as age and income) | Not suspect category — assumed constitutional unless no sound rationale for the law can be provided |
10.2 Brown v. Board of Education: About the Case
- The 1954 United States Supreme Court decision in Oliver L. Brown et.al. v. the Board of Education of Topeka (KS) et.al. is among the most significant judicial turning points in the development of our country. Originally led by Charles H. Houston, and later Thurgood Marshall and a formidable legal team, it dismantled the legal basis for racial segregation in schools and other public facilities.
- By declaring that the discriminatory nature of racial segregation ... "violates the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees all citizens equal protection of the laws," Brown v. Board of Education laid the foundation for shaping future national and international policies regarding human rights.
- Brown v. Board of Education was not simply about children and education. The laws and policies struck down by this court decision were products of the human tendencies to prejudge, discriminate against, and stereotype other people by their ethnic, religious, physical, or cultural characteristics. Ending this behavior as a legal practice caused far reaching social and ideological implications, which continue to be felt throughout our country. The Brown decision inspired, and galvanized human rights struggles across the country and around the world.
- What this legal challenge represents is at the core of United States history and the freedoms we enjoy. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown began a critical chapter in the maturation of our democracy. It reaffirmed the sovereign power of the people of the United States in the protection of their natural rights from arbitrary limits and restrictions imposed by state and local governments. These rights are recognized in the Declaration of Independence and guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
- While this case was an important historic milestone, it is often misunderstood. Over the years, the facts pertaining to the Brown case have been overshadowed by myths and mischaracterizations:
- Brown v. Board of Education was not the first challenge to school segregation. As early as 1849, African Americans filed suit against an educational system that mandated racial segregation, in the case of Roberts v. City of Boston.
- Oliver Brown, the case namesake, was just one of the nearly 200 plaintiffs from five states who were part of the NAACP cases brought before the Supreme Court in 1951. The Kansas case was named for Oliver Brown as a legal strategy to have a man head the plaintiff roster.
- The Brown decision initiated educational and social reform throughout the United States and was a catalyst in launching the modern Civil Rights Movement. Bringing about change in the years since the Brown case continues to be difficult. But the Brown v. Board of Education victory brought this country one step closer to living up to its democratic ideas.
10.3 Proving Unconstitutional Discrimination
The issue: How does one prove that a state action or policy violates the Equal Protection Clause?
When a statute or government policy classifies on the basis of race, the court will strictly scrutinize the classification, insisting that the racial classification be necessary to further a compelling state interest. When, however, a statute is neutral on its face, but is alleged to have been applied in a racially discriminatory way, the analysis will not be so simple. In order to convince the court to apply strict scrutiny, it is necessary to show that the state's action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
Batson v Kentucky holds that excluding a potential juror on account of his or her race violates the Equal Protection Clause. The problem again turns out to be proving discriminatory motive.
Cases
Questions
- When is statistical evidence of discriminatory motive sufficient to shift the burden to government to demonstrate that its motive was in fact race-neutral? What if 20 of 200 Chinese applicants for laundry licenses had received them?
- Why shouldn't proof of disparate impact based on race constitute an equal protection violation, even in the absence of evidence of discriminatory motive?
- In what contexts are statistical disparities based on race very strong evidence of discrimination? In what contexts are such disparities only weak evidence of discrimination?
- What are the problems associated with a test that focuses on motives rather than effects?
- Are bigoted statements by the constituents of elected officials relevant evidence of the officials' discriminatory motive?
- What types of evidence might be introduced to prove discriminatory purpose?
- How should the problem of mixed motivation be handled?
- Does the Court's test effectively allow governments to discriminate so long as they are careful about it?
- Should the court accept race-neutral explanations or consider their weight? If a principal says, explaining the fact that all black students are assigned seats on one side of the classroom and all whites on the other, "It looks better that way," should a court accept that as race-neutral?
Proving Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause
- The person alleging discrimination, in the absence of a statutory classification, must show that a discriminatory purpose was a MOTIVATING factor in the government's action or decision.
- Note:
- A motivating factor need not the SOLE factor in the decision.
- A motivating factor need not be the PRIMARY factor in the decision.
- To show that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, the following evidence could be offered:
- Evidence that the action or decision has a disproportionate impact on the class — the more disproportionate the impact, the stonger the evidence.
- Statements by government decision-makers suggesting a discriminatory purpose:
- Statements at the time of decision
- Statements at the time of trial
- A suspicious pattern of events leading up to the decision
- Evidence that the decision was a departure from usual procedures
- If a discriminatory purpose is established, the government can defend its decision by showing that the same decision would have been made even without the discriminatory purpose.
10.4 Frontiero v. Richardson, Summary (female military officer’s husband as dependent)
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
Facts of the Case:
Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.
Question:
Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause. Applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification, the Court found that the government's interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. The Court held that statutes that drew lines between the sexes on those grounds alone necessarily involved "the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.'"
Decision: 8 votes for Frontiero, 1 vote(s) against
Week 11: Same Sex Marriage Litigation
Links to videos:
Facts of the case
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words "marriage" and "spouse" refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale.
Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been imposed.
On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the executive branch's agreement with the lower court that the act is unconstitutional deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the case?
Does the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives have standing in the case?
Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term "marriage" under federal law as a "legal union between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex couples who are legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law?
Conclusion
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the United States Government, despite the executive branch's agreement regarding DOMA's unconstitutionality, retains a significant enough stake in the issue to support Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Because the judgment in question orders the U.S. Treasury to refund tax money, the Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the case. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) presented substantial arguments for the constitutionality of DOMA that reflected an actual controversy under Article III, which allowed the Supreme Court to address the case without needing to decide whether BLAG would have had standing before a lower court. The Court also held that states have the authority to define marital relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a "disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma" on same-sex couples in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to review the case and that interests in uniformity and stability justified Congress' enactment of DOMA. He also argued that the majority's opinion did not address the issue of state definitions of marriage affecting same-sex couples. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court had neither the jurisdiction to review the case nor the power to invalidate democratically enacted legislation. He argued that the majority's opinion wrongly asserted the supremacy of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of government. However, the majority opinion did not address the issue of whether or not the Equal Protection Clause required laws restricting the definition of marriage to be reviewed under a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. He also argued that the majority misconstrued DOMA's insidious intent and should not rule based on that presumption. Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the United States Government did not have standing in the case because the executive branch declined to defend the statute, but that BLAG did have standing because it chose to defend the otherwise undefended statute. He also argued that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage because that right is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Instead, the issue of the definition of marriage is left to the people to decide, a decision in which DOMA does not interfere. Justice Clarence Thomas partially joined in the dissent.