Exam #1 Notes

Week 1: Opening Material for Torts


1.1 Scope of Tort Law

Tort law covers a wide range of cases. These can include (just examples, not a full list):
  1. Routine personal injury cases (e.g., auto accidents, slip-and-fall cases).
  1. Larger personal injury cases: These include products liability, medical malpractice, and business tort claims.
  1. Mass tort claims: These are usually product liability cases, but on a scale that can affect many thousands of plaintiffs. One example is asbestos claims, of which some 250,000-300,000 are pending in the court system or being settled each year.

1.2 Elements of All the Torts

Every tort is a cause of action, which is a legal reason for bringing a lawsuit. To state a cause of action, a party must allege facts that support every part of the cause of action. Lawyers and paralegals call these parts “elements”. When a party has alleged facts that cover every element of the cause of action, that party has stated a prima facie case.
EXAMPLE: The tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is (1) An act of extreme of outrageous conduct, with (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, which (3) caused (4) severe emotional distress to be suffered. To state a prima facie case, a plaintiff would allege facts covering all four elements.
Let’s imagine some facts: An employer was unhappy with an employee’s work. The employer hired a private investigator to place the employee under surveillance. Coincidentally, the investigator discovered that the employee was cheating on his wife, took photos, and sent them to his wife. The employee's wife subsequently divorced him.
Now if the employee filed an IIED suit against the employer, we would match those facts to the law’s elements. What facts from that example would you use to support each of the following elements?
  1. (Outrageous conduct):
  1. (Intent to cause severe emotional distress):
  1. (Act caused injury):
  1. (Suffered severe emotional distress):

1.3 Categories of Torts

There are three main categories of torts, plus a few miscellaneous torts that do not quite fit. There are also some torts that may overlap between categories: Intentional, Negligence, Strict Liability.
  1. Intentional Torts: For all intentional torts, the plaintiff either intended to bring about the result or knew with substantial certainty that the result would follow from what he/she did or failed to do. EXAMPLES: Battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  1. Negligence is the largest category of torts. Negligence is the failure to act as a reasonable person would act under the circumstances.
  1. Strict Liability is the final category, and it is most often used in product liability cases. If the defendant engages in a certain kind of conduct that causes harm, liability will result even without intent (to cause harm) or negligence (failure to act reasonably).

1.4 Video

🔗
Video: An Overview of Tort Law — International Torts, Negligence, and Strict Liability Professor Lindsay Wiley from American University Washington College of Law opens up Torts with a brief overview of the three main types of torts. Script was written by Prof. Lindsay Wiley, narration was done by Jackie Morrison, and visuals by Aaron Dewald

Week 2: Client Intake & Interviews


2.1 Overview

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to:
  • Identify the main concerns when meeting with a client in a personal injury law practice
  • Describe some features of a typical client intake form (or software program used for client intake)
 
Week 2 focuses on issues related to personal injury law practice. This material is more procedure than substance.
Also in this module, you will see our first Discussion of the semester, which will ask you to watch and evaluate some video clips of software programs that can handle client intake. Please note that the point values of the Discussions vary from 15-17 points each. It's a slightly odd number because I had to get the promised 100 points from six discussions (as described in your syllabus) and so the first one is worth only 15 points.
This module ends with a quiz to test your comprehension of the material.

2.2 Client Intake and Interviews

The Role of a Paralegal in Interviewing and Investigations

In many law firms and organizations, paralegals have substantial client contact. You will often have meetings with clients to learn more background information about their cases.
  • In some law practices, paralegals are also involved in interviewing witnesses and in other aspects of investigating the facts in a case (though most personal injury firms will retain or contract with professional investigators when needed).
  • Plaintiff’s-Side versus Defense Work: In many of our examples here, we are assuming you are a paralegal employed by a law firm that represents plaintiffs in personal injury cases.
    • Bear in mind that many paralegals also work for defense-side law firms, insurance companies, banks, other corporations, and government agencies that continuously get sued by allegedly injured plaintiffs. Try to imagine each step in the process from both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s perspective, and this will help you become better at legal analysis and at client interviewing.

Interviewing in a Personal Injury Case

Interview situations: In the litigation process, there are three main kinds of legal interviews:
  1. The initial client interviews
  1. the follow-up client interviews
  1. the interviews of someone other than a client (which is normally part of a field investigation). We will focus primarily on the initial client interview, but the skills you will practice are important for all three.

Initial Client Interview:

In the client interview, you will obtain facts that will later be pursued through field investigation; follow-up interviews are often needed to clarify new facts and pursue leads uncovered during later investigation. When you first meet a new client, you should have three major concerns, and interviewing him/her will help you obtain facts that pertain to all three:

Concern 1: Liability

  1. Definition: Liability means being legally responsible for something.
  1. Harm must be legally wrongful: Even if someone has caused harm to a client, this harm must be considered wrong under the law in order for your client to have a case.
  1. Liability in Torts requires a plaintiff to successfully state and prove a cause of action (e.g. negligence), which is a legal reason to bring a case.

Concern 2: Damages

  1. Definition: Damages are the amounts of money awarded to the plaintiff once he/she establishes a cause of action against the defendant for a particular tort.
  1. Types of Damages: Compensatory damages are the normal remedy for harm to a plaintiff. They are designed to compensate the plaintiff to a whole position (as near as possible). Punitive damages are larger amounts, designed to punish the defendant for some serious, intentional wrongdoing. Nominal damages ($1 and up) are sometimes awarded if the defendant has done something wrong, but the plaintiff cannot prove he/she has suffered harm as a result.
  1. Money motivation: Many clients (and attorneys) will be motivated to pursue a particular case because of the possibility of earning a big damages award. Most personal injury attorneys only accept cases that have a good chance of winning. Often, PI attorneys are paid on contingency fee basis (a % of the winnings).

Concern 3: Collectability

Similarly, if the plaintiff cannot collect from the defendant, then even a great case may not buy an attorney. This can happen if the defendant is bankrupt, is a small business or individual without substantial assets, or does not carry liability insurance. When interviewing clients, a plaintiff’s attorney or paralegal is looking for defendants with “deep pockets” (sufficient assets to pay for a large judgment or settlement).

2.3 Obtaining the Facts

Checklists and Forms can be very helpful when interviewing clients or witnesses. The questions you will ask in an interview will vary somewhat (depending on the facts of injury/case).
  1. People and Events: Most tort cases involve an event that happened, which is the alleged cause of the injury. To understand the event itself and the plaintiff’s involvement, you will also have to learn more about the important people (the plaintiff(s), the defendant(s), eyewitnesses, physicians, etc.).
  1. Think: Who? What? When? Where? How? And above all, what evidence will we need to prove each element of the case?

2.4 Client Intake Reports

Function

These days, we normally use software or hard copy intake forms, but some firms prefer to write out a report or intake memorandum.
  • This is the interviewer’s written report, which summarizes the important factual information from the interview.
  • In the interview, you will either take notes or record the conversation, and you will then prepare the memo using your notes or recordings. Some law firms have a Client Intake Form for you to fill out, so you do not need to write a separate report.

Audience

Your Client Intake Memo will go your immediate supervisor, who is probably the attorney representing this client. It will then become a part of the client’s case file.

Format of Intake Memo

Intake memos, like other types of legal writing, can follow differing formats. Your supervisor may prefer them a certain way. We will NOT actually write one of these, but I want you to see what they look like.
  1. Heading at the top of the page, which should include the following information:
    1. Your name (interviewer and author of memo)
    2. Supervisor’s name (to whom the memo is addressed)
    3. Date memo was written
    4. Date interview was conducted
    5. Name of case
    6. Office file # of case
    7. RE: After this notation, which means “regarding,” you can state the general subject matter of the memo
  1. Personal Data
    1. Name of client
    2. Home address
    3. Phone numbers where client can be reached
    4. Age of client
    5. Marital status
    6. Place of employment of client
    7. Other relevant info
  1. Statement of the Assignment (Introduction): In the first paragraph of your memo, state the precise objective that you were given in conducting the interview.
  1. Body of the Memo: Presentation of the facts of the case in a coherent, readable manner. You can organize the facts in any logical way (usually chronologically or by issue/topic).
  1. Conclusion: Your supervisor may ask you to give your opinions about the case, include your impressions about the client, or list the next steps that need to be taken in the case (e.g., what further facts should be sought, or evidence obtained). Even if you have not been asked specifically for any of these things, the conclusion provides you an opportunity to briefly discuss any or all of them.

2.5 Investigating in a Personal Injury Case

Objectives: Investigating helps us gather facts. Specifically, our objectives in investigating the facts are:
  1. To record what our client has told us in the interview.
  1. To help our firm decide whether the case should be settled, and for how much.
  1. To help us prepare for trial. All cases are headed towards trial, even those expected to settle. It’s easier to obtain facts earlier than later.
Evidence Law is a complex subject in itself. During investigation, just be aware that we want proof of everything. This includes documents (past wage slips, doctor’s notes, accident diagrams) and witnesses (names, contact information, what can they testify to, etc.).
Tort Law has many different sub-areas, and the more you understand the law of Torts, the better you will be able to ask good questions or seek factual information in interviews/investigations.
Think: Use your common sense. Each of us brings unique experience and an ability to reason intuitively. Be thoughtful, inquisitive, and creative, while remembering your ethical responsibilities and responsibilities to your client.
Organizing Facts: Once you obtain facts from various sources, organize them logically. Depending on the circumstances, they might be arranged chronologically or by issue. If one person (plaintiff, defendant, or witness) has a different recollection of events than another person, you can also develop a different summary of the facts for each of them and see how they differ.

Week 3: The Court System and Stages in a Civil Case

Material on The Court System and the Stages in a Civil Case


III. The Court System and Stages in a Civil Case.
  1. Court Systems
    1. Jurisdiction: There are 50 state court systems and a federal court system. When you hear the word “jurisdiction,” it can refer to a particular state court or geographic area (e.g. California). But “jurisdiction” also refers to the power of a court to hear a particular case. Two kinds of jurisdiction must be satisfied:
    2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or type of dispute. State trial courts usually have general jurisdiction. For a matter to be brought in federal court, it must either: (1) involve a question of federal law (e.g., Civil Rights Act, U.S. Constitution) OR (2) involve opposing parties who are residents of different states, and where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.
    3. Personal Jurisdiction: For a court to have power in a case, it must also have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Personal jurisdiction is satisfied when a defendant has a certain level of “minimum contacts” in the forum (state or district), which can be satisfied through being a resident, owning property or doing business there, or simply being involved in an accident while passing through.
  1. Federal. In the federal court system, there are three levels of courts:
    1. U.S. District Courts (trial courts), which can hear cases brought to trial. Example: U.S. District Court for the Northern District of CA.
    2. U.S. Courts of Appeal (intermediate appellate courts), which can hear appeals brought from district courts. Example: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
    3. U.S. Supreme Court (highest appellate court), which has discretion to hear appeals brought from U.S. Courts of Appeal and from state Supreme Courts on issues involving federal law.
  1. California. In the California court system, there are three levels of courts, plus the possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review in cases involving federal law:
    1. Superior Courts (trial courts), which can hear cases brought to trial. Example: Santa Clara County Superior Court.
    2. CA Courts of Appeal (intermediate appellate courts), which can hear appeals brought from trial courts. Example: CA Court of Appeal, 6th Appellate District.
    3. Supreme Court of California (highest court in state), which has discretion to hear appeals brought from CA Courts of Appeal. Highest court on matters of state law.
    4. U.S. Supreme Court: Cases involving federal issues (e.g., federal constitutional issue) may be appealed beyond the state supreme court, and the U.S. Supreme Court may hear them.
    5. Other states often have different court structures, so be aware that their courts may have unusual names.
  1. Pleadings: Formal, pre-trial documents filed by parties to begin a civil lawsuit. The pleadings contain the parties’ claims, defenses, or other responses.
    1. Complaint: The plaintiff’s statement of claims against the defendant. A copy of the complaint and a summons is served upon the defendant.
    2. Answer: The defendant’s response to the complaint. The defendant must admit or deny allegations in the complaint, and present defenses.
    3. Other types of pleadings include counterclaims (defendant’s claims against plaintiff) and cross-claims (defendant’s claims against a third party who was not originally sued by plaintiff).
  1. Discovery: Once the defendant files an answer, each party can begin to find out more about the strength of the other side’s case through methods of discovery. Under the modern rules of civil procedure, discovery (and not the trial itself) is the most crucial phase of many lawsuits. Some methods of discovery that parties may use are:
    1. Interrogatories: Written questions sent by one party to another party, seeking written answers in return. Parties are limited to 25-35 questions (depending on the court), and they may use these questions to help them locate potential witnesses, establish dates, determine a person’s medical or financial condition, and inquire about the existence of certain evidence, or for other purposes.
    2. Depositions are pre-trial questioning sessions of potential witnesses. Witnesses provide sworn testimony outside of the court, which is recorded by a court reporter. For example, if a physician has treated the plaintiff for injuries, the defendant may want to depose the physician to learn more about the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.
    3. Requests for Admissions are written documents that list statements about specific facts in the case. One party prepares them and requests that the other party admit or deny each of the statements. These are designed to clarify the facts in the case and allow parties to agree some things, so they will not need to be established at trial.
    4. Requests for Documents and Physical Examinations can be made through a number of different motions. They are usually designed to obtain copies of documents in the other party’s possession or to schedule a physical exam when a party’s health or injuries are at issue in the case.
    5. Enforcing Discovery Rights: Parties have an obligation to respond to discovery requests. If one party is not cooperating, the other party can go to the judge and obtain a court order to force its opponent to comply. The court can also use certain sanctions against a party who fails to cooperate, such as prohibiting the use of certain evidence and dismissing some or all of a defendant’s lawsuit.
    6. Out of court settlements are encouraged by the courts and the rules. Before trial, parties usually hold a settlement conference with the judge, and are invited to solve their problems before incurring the additional time and expense of trial litigation. Most civil cases end via settlement, not trial.
  1. Trial and Appeal
    1. Jury Selection: The right to a jury trial is available in most types of cases. Before a jury trial begins, a jury must be chosen. When potential jurors are chosen, they can be questioned by the judge and parties’ attorneys in a process called voir dire. Each side can eliminate potential jurors using challenges for cause (if a juror is unable to serve in an unbiased capacity) or preemptory challenges (dismissing a potential juror with no reason needed; each side has a certain number of peremptories). The acceptable jurors are seated in the jury box and sworn in.
    2. Opening Statements: Attorneys then make opening statements to outline their cases and the evidence they plan to present.
    3. Presentation of Evidence: The plaintiff’s attorney then presents his/her case using witnesses and exhibits as evidence. Federal or state Rules of Evidence govern what can and cannot be admitted or asked of a witness. Direct examination is the questioning of one’s own witness. After direct examination, the other party’s attorney has the right to question the witness also, and this is known as cross-examination.
    4. Closing Arguments give attorneys for each party the chance to summarize their case for jurors and make their strongest arguments one last time.
    5. Jury Instructions: The judge will then instruct the jury members before sending them to deliberate. The judge’s instructions will clearly explain the jury’s duty and the requirements of the law.
    6. Jury Deliberations, Verdict, and Judgment: The jury then deliberates, renders its verdict, is thanked by the judge and dismissed from service. The court issues a judgment in the case, which is the court’s official statement regarding the party’s rights and obligations.
  1. The Appeal
    1. Appealing a Final Judgment: Once a final judgment is issued, the losing party may appeal. Appeals are time-consuming and costly, so not everyone appeals.
    2. Appellate Court Review: Appellate courts do not conduct new trials; they simply review the official record of an appealed case. They limit their review to the issues raised in the appeal, and these can only be issues of law, not of fact.
    3. Appellate Court Action: Appellate courts will generally affirm (support) the lower court’s decision, reverse (overturn) it, or remand the case back to the lower court for more action. After the first appeal, the losing party may appeal again to a higher court but does not have a right to have the appeal considered (higher appellate courts have discretion to review or not to review cases).
  1. Alternatives to Trial and Litigation: Trial Litigation can be expensive, contentious, and time-consuming. Most cases settle before trial, and the court system encourages ‘out of court’ settlements. 
    1. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a cheaper, less contentious, and sometimes quicker route for many parties.
      1. One form of ADR is arbitration, in which the parties agree to appoint a neutral third-party arbitrator to decide a case.
      2. Another form of ADR is mediation, which involves a third party who assists the parties in resolving their dispute through discussion and compromise.

Week 4: Intentional Torts, Part I: Battery and Assault


4.1 Overview

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to:
  • Define intentional torts
  • Explain the elements of the tort of battery
  • Explain the elements of the tort of assault

Overview

Week 4 provides us with our first exposure to substantive tort law. This semester, you will learn about three key areas of tort law: intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability, along with a few oddball torts that do not fit as easily in a larger category. So, we begin where all good tort classes start — with intentional torts.
As we begin the first intentional tort (battery), you'll also learn how the claims and elements work with tort law. You will read a battery case and notice how the court handles the issue of the intent element. Later, we will go through the same definition and explanation of the tort of assault. To reinforce these concepts, there is a short video clip you can watch on these torts. This week's discussion should be entertaining and there is a quiz as well.

4.2 Material on Battery and Assault

Elements in Tort Law

Much like criminal law, elements are very important in torts. To win a tort case, a plaintiff must prove every part (or element) of the claim. That means that the defense can win if it can knock a hole in that case. All the defense needs to do is show that just one of those elements is missing or has not been proven. One hole is all the defense needs to win because the plaintiff is supposed to prove ALL elements of the claim.
So, what is a claim? It is the legal reason for the lawsuit. In criminal law, we know that defendants are charged with crimes (such as “arson”). Here on the civil side, we do not have crimes, but we do have claims. When a case is filed, it uses a claim as its reason, as its theory of liability. We could call it “a battery case” or “a lawsuit for negligence” because it is using one of those claims as its basis.
Recognized claims in intentional torts include the first two we will consider, “battery” and “assault”. These are separate, so let’s start with the claim of battery. If you open up a tort book and find a definition of battery, it will look something like this one below. It may be slightly different, since this is a basic common law definition, but it will have the same main parts to it.

Battery —

Battery is an act, involving harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person, with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact (or intent to cause apprehension of an immediate contact), and causation of the harmful or offensive contact.
  • Torts is mainly a common law subject. There are some written statutes in state codes, but most of the rules come from previous case law. And a court hearing a battery case would also look at the individual elements of that battery definition.
  • What are the parts of the case that need to be proven? What are the elements of battery? The court might separate them out and number/label them like this:
    • Elements: Battery is (1) An act, involving (2) harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person, with (3) intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact (or intent to cause apprehension of an immediate contact), and (4) causation of the harmful or offensive contact.
      • Do you notice Element #3 there? It’s intent. And it’s a required element for all intentional torts. Other torts, like negligence, do not require that the plaintiff show intent. But battery requires it. In a moment, you’ll read a case that illustrates this point. But first, let’s define the elements of battery.

Defining the Elements

  1. Act. Voluntary movement of defendant’s body.
  1. Harmful OR offensive contactHarmful: Involving physical damage, impairment, pain, or illness to the body. Offensive: Offending the personal dignity of an ordinary person who is not unduly sensitive.
  1. Intent. Either:
    1. the desire to bring about the consequences of the act, OR
    2. the substantially certain knowledge that the consequences will follow from the act (e.g., the contact would occur).
  1. Causation. Either:
    1. but for the defendant’s act, the consequences would not have occurred, OR
    2. the defendant’s act was a substantial factor in bringing about the consequences (e.g., the contact).
  1. Now please focus on these elements as you read the following case:

Garrett v. Dailey

Click above for summary
 
Ruth Garratt, Appellant,
v.
Brian Dailey, a Minor, by George S. Dailey, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondent
Supreme Court of Washington
46 Wash. 2d 197; 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
OPINION. HILL, J. The liability of an infant for an alleged battery is presented to this court for the first time. Brian Dailey (age five years, nine months) was visiting with Naomi Garratt, an adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, likewise an adult, in the backyard of the plaintiff's home, on July 16, 1951. It is plaintiff's contention that she came out into the backyard to talk with Naomi and that, as she started to sit down in a wood and canvas lawn chair, Brian deliberately pulled it out from under her. The only one of the three persons present so testifying was Naomi Garratt. (Ruth Garratt, the plaintiff, did not testify as to how or why she fell.) The trial court, unwilling to accept this testimony, adopted instead Brian Dailey's version of what happened, and made the following findings:
"III. . . . that while Naomi Garratt and Brian Dailey were in the back yard the plaintiff, Ruth  Garratt,came out of her house into the back yard. Sometime subsequent thereto defendant, Brian Dailey, picked up a lightly built wood and canvas lawn chair which was then and there located in the back yard of the above described premises, moved it sideways a few feet and seated himself therein, at which time he discovered the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, about to sit down at the place where the lawn chair had formerly been, at which time he hurriedly got up from the chair and attempted to move it toward Ruth Garratt to aid her in sitting down in the chair; that due to the defendant's small size and lack of dexterity he was unable to get the lawn chair under the plaintiff in time to prevent her from falling to the ground. That plaintiff fell to the ground and sustained a fracture of her hip, and other injuries and damages as hereinafter set forth.
" IV. That the preponderance of the evidence in this case establishes that when the defendant, Brian Dailey, moved the chair in question he did not have any willful or unlawful purpose in doing so; that he did not have any intent to injure the plaintiff, or any intent to bring about any unauthorized or offensive contact with her person or any objects appurtenant thereto; that the circumstances which immediately preceded the fall of the plaintiff established that the defendant, Brian Dailey, did not have purpose, intent or design to perform a prank or to effect an assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff." (Italics ours, for a purpose hereinafter indicated.)
It is conceded that Ruth Garratt's fall resulted in a fractured hip and other painful and serious injuries.
To obviate the necessity of a retrial in the event this court determines that she was entitled to a judgment against Brian Dailey, the amount of her damage was found to be eleven thousand dollars. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the action and asks for the entry of a judgment in that amount or a new trial.
The authorities generally, but with certain notable exceptions (see Bohlen, "Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons," 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9), state that, when a minor has committed a tort with force, he is liable to be proceeded against as any other person would be. Paul v. Hummel (1868), 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am. Dec. 381; Huchting v. Engel (1863), 17 Wis. 237, 84 Am. Dec. 741; Briese v. Maechtle (1911), 146 Wis. 89, 130 N. W. 893; 1 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 194, § 66; Prosser on Torts 1085, § 108; 2 Kent's Commentaries 241; 27 Am. Jur. 812, Infants, § 90.
In our analysis of the applicable law, we start with the basic premise that Brian, whether five or fifty-five, must have committed some wrongful act before he could be liable for appellant's injuries.
 
It is urged that Brian's action in moving the chair constituted a battery. A definition (not all-inclusive but sufficient for our purpose) of a battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact upon another.
 
… In the comment [to Section 13 of the Restatement of Torts], the Restatement says:
"Character of actor's intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact … to a particular person… the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact … or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact … is substantially certain to be produced."
We have here the conceded volitional act of Brian, i.e., the moving of a chair. Had the plaintiff proved to the satisfaction of the trial court that Brian moved the chair while she was in the act of sitting down, Brian's action would patently have been for the purpose or with the intent of causing the plaintiff's bodily contact with the ground, and she would be entitled to a judgment against him for the resulting damages. Vosburg v. Putney (1891), 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403; Briese v. Maechtle, supra.
The plaintiff based her case on that theory, and the trial court held that she failed in her proof and accepted Brian's version of the facts rather than that given by the eyewitness who testified for the plaintiff. After the trial court determined that the plaintiff had not established her theory of a battery (i.e., that Brian had pulled the chair out from under the plaintiff while she was in the act of sitting down), it then became concerned with whether a battery was established under the facts as it found them to be.
In this connection, we quote another portion of the comment on the "Character of actor's intention," relating to clause (a) of the rule from the Restatement heretofore set forth:
"It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even though the actor realizes or should realize that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about the contact ... Such realization may make the actor's conduct negligent or even reckless but unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty, the contact… will result, the actor has not that intention which is necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this Section."
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff's fall, it was proved that, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been. If Brian had any of the intents which the trial court found, in the italicized portions of the findings of fact quoted above, that he did not have, he would of course have had the knowledge to which we have referred. The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge. Mercer v. Corbin (1889), 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132, 3 L. R. A. 221. Without such knowledge, there would be nothing wrongful about Brian's act in moving the chair, and there being no wrongful act, there would be no liability.
While a finding that Brian had no such knowledge can be inferred from the findings made, we believe that before the plaintiff's action in such a case should be dismissed there should be no question but that the trial court had passed upon that issue; hence, the case should be remanded for clarification of the findings to specifically cover the question of Brian's knowledge, because intent could be inferred therefrom. If the court finds that he had such knowledge, the necessary intent will be established and the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, even though there was no purpose to injure or embarrass the plaintiff. Vosburg v. Putney, supra. If Brian did not have such knowledge, there was no wrongful act by him, and the basic premise of liability on the theory of a battery was not established.
It will be noted that the law of battery as we have discussed it is the law applicable to adults, and no significance has been attached to the fact that Brian was a child less than six years of age when the alleged battery occurred. The only circumstance where Brian's age is of any consequence is in determining what he knew, and there his experience, capacity, and understanding are of course material.
 
The cause is remanded (back to the lower court) for clarification, with instructions to make definite findings on the issue of whether Brian Dailey knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair which he moved had been, and to change the judgment if the findings warrant it.
Remanded for clarification.
--------------end of case opinion-----------------
So, you can see how that court focused in on the element of intent. It was a battery claim, and intent is a required element of battery. Did the plaintiff prove that the child had the required intent? The court explained that definition, that “the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact … or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact … is substantially certain to be produced.”
Can a child (of the age of five years and nine months, in Brian Dailey’s case) have that required knowledge about the consequences of his actions? This was an appellate court (the Washington state Supreme Court) reviewing the case here and it did not find the answer to that question from its review of the lower court’s case. Remember, appellate courts do not re-hear cases; they rely on the lower courts to conduct the trials and develop the facts. So ultimately, this court decided it did not have enough information to decide the case. Instead, it chose to send the case back down (remand it) to the trial court for further development to determine whether the child had the knowledge required to prove the intent element of a battery.

Assault —

(1) An act, with
(2) intent either:
  1. to cause harmful or offensive contact, OR
  1. to cause an apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact,
(3) apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff’s own person, and
(4) causation of the apprehension.
Most people think assault is like a battery, including physical touching and harm, but that it is not true for the civil tort of assault. It is putting someone in fear (apprehension) of suffering that touching. Basically, it is putting someone in fear of a battery.
Please read the following case, Cullison v. Medley. Was the guy in the case a sleazebag? Perhaps so, but the case was about what the family did to him and whether it could be considered assault. To shorten this case opinion, I have removed discussions of some other claims that were included (trespass, invasion of privacy, and IIED). We will get to those ones soon enough, but our focus now is on how this court explains and analyzes the tort of assault.

Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27 (1991)

Click above for summary
 
Dan R. CULLISON, Appellant, (Plaintiff below), v. Ernest W. MEDLEY, Doris Medley, Ron Medley, Sandy Medley, and Terry Simmons, Appellees. (Defendants below).
No. 84 Sol 9104 CV 32.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 23, 1991.
  • 28 Rudolph Wm. Savich, Bloomington, for appellant.
Robert C. Price, Price and Runnells, Bloomington, for appellees.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
KRAHULIK, Justice.
Dan R. Cullison (Appellant-Plaintiff below) petitions this Court to accept transfer of this cause in order to reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment against him and in favor of the Appellees-Defendants below (collectively "the Medleys"). The Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Cullison v. Medley (1990), Ind. App., 559 N.E.2d 619. For the reasons set forth below, we grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand to the trial court.
The sole issue presented for review is whether the "impact rule" prohibits Cullison from recovering under any of several legal theories for emotional distress resulting from the Medleys alleged wrongdoings. In his four-count complaint, Cullison alleged trespass, assault, harrassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and sought to recover damages for his emotional and psychological injury.
In reviewing the propriety of the trial court's entry of summary judgment, we apply the same standard applicable in the trial court. We must construe the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Only if such evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law should the summary judgment be affirmed. Ind.Trial Rule 56; Ayres v. Indiana Heights Volunteer Fire Dept. (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234. We conclude that the evidence presented to the trial court construed in favor of the non-moving party, Cullison, establishes questions of fact which require jury resolution on three of the four counts alleged in Cullison's complaint.
According to Cullison's deposition testimony, on February 2, 1986, he encountered Sandy, the 16-year-old daughter of Ernest, in a Linton, Indiana, grocery store parking lot. They exchanged pleasantries and Cullison invited her to have a Coke with him and to come to his home to talk further. A few hours later, someone knocked on the door of his mobile home. Cullison got out of bed and answered the door. He testified that he saw a person standing in the darkness who said that she wanted to talk to him. Cullison answered that he would have to get dressed because he had been in bed. Cullison went back to his bedroom, dressed, and returned to the darkened living room of his trailer. When he entered the living room and turned the lights on, he was confronted by Sandy Medley, as well as by father Ernest, brother Ron, mother Doris, and brother-in-law Terry Simmons. Ernest was on crutches due to knee surgery and had a revolver in a holster strapped to his thigh. Cullison testified that Sandy called him a "pervert" and told him he was "sick," mother Doris berated him while keeping her hand in her pocket, convincing Cullison that she also was carrying a pistol. Ron and Terry said nothing to Cullison, but their presence in his trailer home further intimidated him. Primarily, however, Cullison's attention was riveted *29 to the gun carried by Ernest. Cullison testified that, while Ernest never withdrew the gun from his holster, he "grabbed for the gun a few times and shook the gun" at plaintiff while threatening to "jump astraddle" of Cullison if he did not leave Sandy alone. Cullison testified that Ernest "kept grabbing at it with his hand, like he was going to take it out," and "took it to mean he was going to shoot me" when Ernest threatened to "jump astraddle" of Cullison. Although no one actually touched Cullison, his testimony was that he feared he was about to be shot throughout the episode because Ernest kept moving his hand toward the gun as if to draw the revolver from the holster while threatening Cullison to leave Sandy alone.
As the Medleys were leaving, Cullison suffered chest pains and feared that he was having a heart attack. Approximately two months later, Cullison testified that Ernest glared at him in a menacing manner while again armed with a handgun at a restaurant in Linton. On one of these occasions, Ernest stood next to the booth where Cullison was seated while wearing a pistol and a holster approximately one foot from Cullison's face. Shortly after the incident at his home, Cullison learned that Ernest had previously shot a man. This added greatly to his fear and apprehension of Ernest on the later occasions when Ernest glared at him and stood next to the booth at which he was seated while armed with a handgun in a holster.
Cullison testified that as a result of the incident, he sought psychological counseling and therapy and continued to see a therapist for approximately 18 months. Additionally, Cullison sought psychiatric help and received prescription medication which prevented him from operating power tools or driving an automobile, thus injuring Cullison in his sole proprietorship construction business. Additionally, Cullison testified that he suffered from nervousness, depression, sleeplessness, inability to concentrate and impotency following his run-in with the Medleys.
(Consideration of a claim of Trespass was removed from this summary, since our class focus is the Assault claim here).
  1. Assault
In count two of his complaint, Cullison alleged an assault. The Court of Appeals decided that, because Ernest never removed his gun from the holster, his threat that he was going to "jump astraddle" of Cullison constituted conditional language which did not express any present intent to harm Cullison and, therefore, was not an assault. Further, the Court of Appeals decided that even if it were to find an assault, summary judgment was still appropriate because Cullison alleged only emotional distress and made no showing that the Medleys' actions were malicious, callous, or willful or that the alleged injuries he suffered were a foreseeable result of the Medleys' conduct. We disagree.
It is axiomatic that assault, unlike battery, is effectuated when one acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or an imminent apprehension of such contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965). It is the right to be free from the apprehension of a battery which is protected by the tort action which we call an assault. As this Court held approximately 90 years ago in Kline v. Kline (1901), 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9, an assault constitutes "a touching of the mind, if not of the body." Because it is a touching of the mind, as opposed to the body, the damages which are recoverable for an assault are damages for mental trauma and distress. "Any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of a battery may constitute an assault. It is an assault to shake a fist under another's nose, to aim or strike at him with a weapon, or to hold it in a threatening position, to rise or advance to strike another, to surround him with a display of force...." W. Prosser & J. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 10 (5th ed. 1984). Additionally, the apprehension must be one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person. Id. Finally, the tort is complete with the invasion of the plaintiff's mental peace.
The facts alleged and testified to by Cullison could, if believed, entitle him to recover for an assault against the Medleys. A jury could reasonably conclude that the Medleys intended to frighten Cullison by surrounding him in his trailer and threatening him with bodily harm while one of them was armed with a revolver, even if that revolver was not removed from its holster. Cullison testified that Ernest kept grabbing at the pistol as if he were going to take it out, and that Cullison thought *31 Ernest was going to shoot him. It is for the jury to determine whether Cullison's apprehension of being shot or otherwise injured was one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person. It was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment on the count two allegation of assault.
(There were additional claims of Invasion of Privacy and IIED, but these parts of the case were removed by your instructor since the focus of this unit is on the tort of Assault only.)
  • ------end of case opinion-------
Hopefully, this helps illustrate how the torts of battery and assault operate and how courts view them. If you have questions or want to discuss further, please feel free to mention it in this week's discussion.

4.3 Intentional Torts: Summary

🔗
Video: An Overview of Intentional Torts Professor Lindsay Wiley teaches us about the five main intentional torts. She will walk you through the restatements and how they relate to the Prima Facie elements of each. Script written by Prof. Linsday Wiley of American University Washington College of Law. Narration by Jackie Morrison, University of Utah. Visuals by Aaron Dewald, University of Utah
 

4.4 The Same Conduct Can Give Rise to Civil and Criminal Liability

Assault and battery are intentional torts, meaning they can serve as the basis for a civil lawsuit demanding compensation in the form of money damages. But in every state, assault and battery are also crimes, meaning that assault and battery can also result in prosecution by the state and, if the accused is found guilty, can result in jail time. How can the same actions result in two very different court cases? Read on to learn more about the difference between civil and criminal assault and battery.

"Assault and Battery" Defined

Criminal and civil assault and battery share largely the same definition, although each state has different criminal statutes that may vary slightly in the way they define the specific conduct and intent necessary to constitute a criminal act.
  • Threat of action — by one person that puts another person in apprehension of imminent bodily harm.
    • Battery — again, both civil and criminal -- is usually the logical extension of assault (a completed assault, in other words). An action that starts as an assault becomes a battery when there is an actual physical touching.
      • As an example, if a person raises a fist to you and you believe you're about to be punched, that person has committed an assault, since you're put in fear of an imminent punching. Even if the punch is never thrown, the threat of the punch is enough to constitute assault. If the same person follows through with the punch and connects with your body, you've been battered. Assault and battery are so intertwined that they are often referred to as one cause of action.

Civil Assault and Battery

Civil assault and battery are torts. A tort is a wrong committed by one person against another, causing damage. Specifically, civil assault and battery are intentional torts. Most torts arise from a negligent act, meaning an act that was careless or reckless.
  • "Regular" torts don't take the intent of the tortfeasor (the person committing the tort) into consideration. As long as the tortfeasor had a duty to act in a non-negligent manner, and they breached that duty and caused harm to someone, they are said to have committed the tort.
  • Intentional torts are torts that are committed on purpose. In addition to assault and battery, causes of action such as false imprisonment, slander, and fraud typically fall under this category.
  • While the requirements of duty, breach, causation and damages are the same, the added element of the tortfeasor's intent is taken into consideration as well. If a plaintiff cannot prove that the tort was committed intentionally, it may be a case of negligence as opposed to an intentional tort.
 

Scenario:

Imagine you are standing in a parking lot loading groceries into your car. Another vehicle across the lane accelerates rapidly in reverse, directly toward you and your vehicle. That same simple set of facts can be illustrative of negligence, or it may amount to assault and battery. How?
  1. First, consider that the driver was reaching for a fallen cellphone and slipped and hit the gas, causing the car to move quickly in reverse.
  1. If the driver strikes you or your vehicle, the driver has committed general negligence.
  1. He had a duty to operate his vehicle in a non-negligent manner, and he breached that duty and caused you harm.
  1. Now imagine that, immediately prior to getting into his car, the driver was yelling and cursing at you for being in his way while he was trying to back out. Instead of dropping a cellphone and accidentally hitting the gas, the tortfeasor deliberately threw the car into reverse and drove toward you, slamming on the brakes at the last instant to avoid hitting you.
    1. You were legitimately apprehensive — you were afraid he was going to run you over, in other words.
    2. The tortfeasor has intentionally placed you in apprehension of imminent physical harm and has committed civil assault.
    3. If the driver actually hits you, he has committed civil battery. The driver's intent is key.

Criminal Assault and Battery

A crime occurs when an individual violates a criminal statute that prohibits and punishes certain conduct. Criminal cases are brought and prosecuted by the state, in the interest of protecting the public welfare. A jury of one's peers (or a judge) must agree that the government (usually represented by a district attorney) has proven -- beyond a reasonable doubt -- that the charged crime was committed by the defendant. If a guilty verdict is entered against the defendant, incarceration can follow.
As mentioned above, every state has criminal statutes pertaining to assault and battery. The criminal prosecution of assault and battery differs from a civil case in two important ways:
  • the burden of proof is stricter in a criminal case, and
  • there is the added requirement of proving the violation of a specific criminal statute, as worded by the legislature.
Using the parking lot example above, the driver could be charged with assault and battery if he intended to strike you with his vehicle and there were laws prohibiting such behavior (which, again, are on the books in every state).
A verdict of not guilty in a criminal assault or battery case does not prevent a victim from filing a civil suit for the same action. Since civil suits involve monetary damages and aren't brought by the state, double jeopardy rules (which prohibit trying a person more than once for the same actions) are inapplicable. A person can be found not guilty of a crime but can still be found civilly liable and be forced to pay damages arising out of the same incident. The best modern example of this is the O.J. Simpson trial, where he was found not guilty of the crime of murder but was later found civilly liable for the wrongful death of the victims.

Week 5: Intentional Torts. False Imprisonment and False Arrest


5.1 Overview

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to:
  • Describe the elements of the tort of false imprisonment
  • Apply the elements of false imprisonment in a hypothetical case

Overview

In Week 5, we continue our journey through Intentional Torts. Last time, in addition to learning about the torts of Battery and Assault, we also went through the importance of claims and their elements. This week, you'll have the chance to read two cases that describe the elements of False Imprisonment. We'll begin by reading these cases and then see how the elements are defined. Also, you will find some short files or links in the module describing False Arrest. Under California law, it is much the same as False Imprisonment.
There will be a quiz to finish up this unit.

5.2 Material on False Imprisonment

False Imprisonment
(Please see the separate file in Canvas about False Arrest in California, which is quite similar to False Imprisonment)
Please read the following two cases, Andrews v. Piedmont Airlines and Whittaker v. Sanford. Consider how these courts explain the elements of False Imprisonment and how they apply.
Andrews v. Piedmont Air Lines 297 S.C. 367, 377 S.E.2d 127 (S.C. App. 1989) Court of Appeals of South Carolina
PER CURIAM: . . . Clarence Andrews sued Piedmont Air Lines for an incident which occurred after Piedmont denied him boarding on a flight due to his physical incapacity to travel unaccompanied. The circuit court granted Piedmont's motion for summary judgment. Andrews appeals. We affirm. 
In 1984, Andrews, a diabetic who had previously suffered a stroke, was admitted to Greenville Memorial Hospital for circulatory problems in his right leg. As a result of the stroke, his speech was slurred, he drooled, and his left side was paralyzed. Unfortunately, the treatment for his leg was unsuccessful and it had to be amputated above the knee. During the recovery period, the hospital contacted Andrews' daughter in Florida and asked if her father could live with her. She agreed and the hospital arranged the trip. A hospital social worker, Andrew Irwin, telephoned Piedmont and reserved a seat for Andrews. Piedmont informed Irwin that the airline had guidelines governing travel by unaccompanied physically handicapped passengers.
Under the guidelines, Piedmont would accept the passenger if he (1) could use the lavatory without assistance, (2) was able to sit in a normal sitting position with the seatbelt properly fastened, and (3) required no assistance eating.  
In December 1984, the hospital discharged Andrews and took him by ambulance to the Greenville/Spartanburg Airport. He was placed in an airport wheelchair and taken to the Piedmont ticket counter. He purchased a ticket and was wheeled to the gate area to wait for his flight. While waiting to embark, Andrews asked other passengers for cigarettes and asked a passenger to tie his leg to the wheelchair. The supervisor of airport security notified Milton Ward, the Piedmont station manager, of a potential problem at the departure gate. When Ward arrived at the gate, he found Andrews slumped over in the wheelchair with saliva drooling out of the side of his mouth. Ward questioned Andrews about his ability to go to the bathroom by himself. He received a negative answer. Since Andrews did not meet Piedmont's guidelines, Ward kept him off the flight. Andrews was removed from the passenger waiting area to an area adjacent to the Piedmont office and ticket counter. Piedmont telephoned the hospital to come get Andrews. Upon receipt of Piedmont's call, Irwin went to the airport and found Andrews in a wheelchair. He called the hospital requesting an ambulance and remained with Andrews, one and a half to two hours, until it arrived. Andrews returned to the hospital and alternate travel plans were arranged….
False imprisonment is depriving the plaintiff of his liberty without lawful justification. Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 S.C. 95, 113 S.E.2d 337 (1960); Strong v. City of Milwaukee, 38 Wis.2d 564, 157 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
In order to establish a cause of action, the evidence must prove:
  1. That the defendant restrained the plaintiff;
  1. That the restraint was intentional; and
  1. That the restraint was unlawful. 
 
The facts of this case do not support a cause of action for false imprisonment. Assuming Piedmont restrained Andrews, there is no evidence that the restraint was unlawful. Common carriers have a higher duty of care towards noticeably handicapped passengers. See Singletary v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 217 S.C. 212, 60 S.E.2d 305 (1950).
Due to his physical condition, Andrews was not ambulatory. Piedmont placed Andrews in the area adjacent to the ticket counter so they could periodically check on him and find him when the ambulance arrived. There is no evidence that he protested waiting there or that he asked to be moved to another location. Further, after Irwin arrived, Andrews did not leave in Irwin's personal car, but chose to wait for the ambulance in this same area. In light of Andrews' condition, the alleged restraint was reasonable, and it might well have been a breach of a Piedmont's duty if they had not detained him until Irwin arrived. The trial court correctly granted the motion for summary judgment on the cause of action for false imprisonment. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment. AFFIRMED.
  • -----------------------------------------------------
Whittaker v. Sandford 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399 (Me. 1912) Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
SAVAGE, J. [Plaintiff was a member (and her husband was a minister) of a religious sect, of which defendant was the leader. The sect had colonies in Maine and Jaffa (now Tel Aviv), the latter of which plaintiff had joined. Plaintiff decided to abandon the sect and to return to America. While she and her four children were awaiting passage from Jaffa on a steamer, the defendant offered her passage back to America on his yacht. When plaintiff told defendant that she was afraid he would not let her off the yacht until she was “won to the movement again,” defendant assured her repeatedly that under no circumstances would she be detained on board.
  • Plaintiff accepted this assurance and sailed for America on the yacht. On arrival in port, defendant refused to furnish her with a boat so that she could leave. When plaintiff raised the issue with her husband, he said it was up to the defendant, the leader of the sect and owner of the yacht.
  • She remained on board for nearly a month, during which time defendant and plaintiff’s husband attempted to persuade her to rejoin the sect. On several occasions, plaintiff was allowed to go ashore to the mainland and to various islands, but always in the company of her husband.
  • She was not allowed to leave the yacht unaccompanied. She finally obtained her release with the assistance of the sheriff and a writ of habeas corpus. She then brought this action for false imprisonment. The jury returned a verdict in her favor for $1100. Defendant excepted to the court’s instructions and appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial.]
…The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff to recover must show that the restraint was physical, and not merely a moral influence; that it must have been actual physical restraint, in the sense that one intentionally locked into a room would be physically restrained but not necessarily involving physical force upon the person; that it was not necessary that the defendant, or any person by his direction, should lay his hand upon the plaintiff; that if the plaintiff was restrained so that she could not leave the yacht Kingdom by the intentional refusal to furnish transportation as agreed, she not having it in her power to escape otherwise, it would be a physical restraint and unlawful imprisonment.
We think the instructions were apt and sufficient. If one should, without right, turn the key in a door, and thereby prevent a person in the room from leaving, it would be the simplest form of unlawful imprisonment. The restraint is physical. The four walls and the locked door are physical impediments to escape. Now is it different when one who is in control of a vessel at anchor, within practical rowing distance from the shore, who has agreed that a guest on board shall be free to leave, there being no means to leave except by rowboats, wrongfully refuses the guest the use of a boat? The boat is the key. By refusing the boat he turns the key. The guest is as effectually locked up as if there were walls along the sides of the vessel. The restraint is physical. The impassable sea is the physical barrier.
A careful study of the evidence leads us to conclude that the jury were warranted in finding that the defendant was guilty of unlawful imprisonment. This, to be sure, is not an action based upon the defendant's failure to keep his agreement to permit the plaintiff to leave the yacht as soon as it should reach shore. But his duty under the circumstances is an important consideration. It cannot be believed that either party to the agreement understood that it was his duty merely to bring her to an American harbor. The agreement implied that she was to go ashore. There was no practical way for her to go ashore except in the yacht's boats. The agreement must be understood to mean that he would bring her to land, or to allow her to get to land, by the only available means. The evidence is that he refused her a boat. His refusal was wrongful. The case leaves not the slightest doubt that he had the power to control the boats, if he chose to exercise it. It was not enough for him to leave it to the husband to say whether she might go ashore or not. She had a personal right to go on shore. If the defendant personally denied her the privilege, as the jury might find he did, it was a wrongful denial.
  • ------end of case opinion-------
Definition/Elements. False Imprisonment is:
(1) An act that completely confines plaintiff within fixed boundaries set by the defendant, with
(2) intent to confine the plaintiff or a third party, and
(3) causation of the plaintiff’s confinement, when
(4) the plaintiff was either conscious of the confinement OR was physically harmed by it.
Defining the Elements
  1. Act. A voluntary movement of the defendant’s body.
  1. Complete: A total confinement where plaintiff knows of no safe or inoffensive means of escape.
  1. Confine: A restraint of plaintiff’s freedom of movement (e.g., by physical barriers, physical force, threat of physical force, threat of legal authority to confine, or refusing to release plaintiff).
  1. Intent to confine. The intent to confine plaintiff or the knowledge with substantial certainty that the defendant’s act will result in the confinement.
  1. Causation: But for the defendant’s act, plaintiff would not have been confined, or defendant’s act was a substantial factor in plaintiff’s confinement.
  1. Consciousness of the Confinement or Physical harm: At the very least, the plaintiff must have been conscious of the fact that he/she was confined.
Hopefully that helps illuminate the tort of false imprisonment. As with other torts, False Imprisonment is a civil tort. But remember that a tortfeasor might also be guilty of a criminal law under the same facts.

5.3 California Law on False Arrests

A “false arrest” is the same “tort” as a “false imprisonment” under California law.
In a nutshell, an arrest by a peace officer in California is lawful if it’s either made pursuant to a facially valid warrant, or when the police have probable cause to believe that another has committed a crime. Unlike federal law, under California law, the burden is on the police to justify false arrest / false imprisonment of you at a civil trial (See, California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) 1401 [False Arrest by Peace Officer Without Warrant] and 1402 [Peace Officer's Justification / Defense To Claim Of False Arrest].)
Under California law, a peace officer (i.e. police officer or deputy sheriff) may arrest another for a felony for which the officer has “probable cause” to believe person committed or may arrest another for a misdemeanor that was committed in their presence (See, Cal. Penal Code § 836.) “Presence is not mere physical proximity but is determined by whether the offense is apparent to the officers senses”. People v. Sjosten, 262 Cal.App.2d 539, 543-544 (1968″.) An officer can arrest a civilian, upon probable cause, for any felony; committed in the presence of an officer or not. Cal. Penal Code § 836. However, it does not violate the fourth amendment, for an officer to arrest for a misdemeanor that was committed outside of the presence of the officer, even though such an arrest violates California state law.
 

5.4 California Case Law and Other Sources on False Imprisonment

Sources and Authority

  • “The crime of false imprisonment is defined by Penal Code section 236 as the ‘unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.’ The tort is identically defined. As we recently formulated it, the tort consists of the ‘ “nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” ’ That length of time can be as brief as 15 minutes. Restraint may be effectuated by means of physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by physical barriers, or by means of any other form of unreasonable duress.” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 716 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559], internal citations omitted.)
  • “ ‘[T]he tort [of false imprisonment] consists of the “ ‘nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.’ ” ’ ” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001, internal citations omitted.)
  • “The only mental state required to be shown to prove false imprisonment is the intent to confine, or to create a similar intrusion.” (Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 716.)
  • “[False imprisonment] requires some restraint of the person and that he be deprived of his liberty or compelled to stay where he does not want to remain, or compelled to go where he does not wish to go; and that the person be restrained of his liberty without sufficient complaint or authority.” (Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 459—460 [50 Cal.Rptr. 586], internal citations omitted.)
  • “[I]t is clear that force or the threat of force are not the only means by which the tort of false imprisonment can be achieved. Fraud or deceit or any unreasonable duress are alternative methods of accomplishing the tort.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002, internal citations omitted.)
  • “Because ‘[t]here is no real or free consent when it is obtained through fraud’ . . . the [plaintiffs’] confinement on the aircraft was nonconsensual and therefore actionable as a false imprisonment.” (Scofieldsupra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, fn. 16, internal citations omitted.)
  • “[C]ontemporaneous awareness of the false imprisonment is not, and need not be, an essential element of the tort.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.)
  • “[T]he critical question as to causation in intentional torts is whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the type of harm which he intended from his original act.” (Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1536, fn. 6 [254 Cal.Rptr. 492], internal citations omitted.)
  • “[T]he law of this state clearly allows a cause of action for false imprisonment notwithstanding the fact a plaintiff suffered merely nominal damage.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.)
  • “In addition to recovery for emotional suffering and humiliation, one subjected to false imprisonment is entitled to compensation for other resultant harm, such as loss of time, physical discomfort or inconvenience, any resulting physical illness or injury to health, business interruption, and damage to reputation, as well as punitive damages in appropriate cases.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009, internal citation omitted.)

Secondary Sources

5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 426—429
3 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 42, False Imprisonment and False Arrest, §§ 42.01, 42.07, 42.20 (Matthew Bender)
22 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 257, False Imprisonment, § 257.17 (Matthew Bender)
10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 103, False Imprisonment, § 103.40 et seq. (Matthew Bender)
1 California Civil Practice: Torts §§ 13:8—13:10 (Thomson Reuters West)
 

Week 6: Week 6: Intentional Torts, Part III. Trespass. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)


6.1 Overview

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to:
  • Describe the elements of the tort of trespass to land
  • Describe the elements of the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
  • Apply the elements of false imprisonment in a hypothetical case

Overview

We have two more international torts here in Week 6. As always, we will focus on the claims themselves and their elements, which is how a plaintiff proves a case or a defendant defeats it. Trespass includes multiple torts, but we will focus on Trespass to Land, which comes up much more often than the other ones (Trespass to Chattels and Conversion are truly rare and obscure). IIED is a separate tort, unrelated to Trespass, but we are covering them both this week. I think the cases you'll read illustrate each one quite well and show how courts break down and apply their elements.
We have a great discussion topic this week. Instructions are in the Discussion tool; it involves a farmer's attempt to exact revenge on people who were parking on his land. Revenge - aha! - perfect material for a torts discussion. And there is a quiz at the end of this module.

6.2 Material on Trespass to Land and IIED

Trespass and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

These are two very different torts. We cover them back-to-back, but there is no inherent similarity between the two (aside from the fact that both are intentional torts).
Trespass to Land (we will skip Trespass to Chattels, used for personal property, since it is very rare)
Trespass to Land involves intrusion on someone else’s land. It is often confused with Nuisance, another tort that can occur when a defendant interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his/her land. Here, we are only studying Trespass to Land and not the more complex Nuisance Law. In some ways, nuisance is a tort, but it’s also a property law concept.
 
Here is an important case on Trespass. In this case, it is alleged that a ray of light can create a trespass. See how the court handles this, click the case below.
Trespass to Land exists when the following elements are present:
  1. An act, involving
  1. intrusion on land that is
  1. in possession of another, with
  1. intent to intrude, and
  1. causation (of the instrusion)
Defining the Elements:
  1. Act: Voluntary movement of the body that leads to the intrusion.
  1. IntrusionOne of the following (by defendant):
    1. Physically going on the land,
    2. Remaining on the land,
    3. Going to a prohibited portion of the land, OR
    4. Failing to remove goods from the land.
  1. PossessionOne of the following (by plaintiff):
    1. Actual occupancy with intent to have exclusive control over the land, OR
    2. The right to immediate occupancy with intent to control it.
  1. Intent: The intent to intrude on the land OR the knowledge with substantial certainty that an intrusion will result from the action or failure to act.
  1. Causation: But for what the defendant did, the intrusion would not have occurred OR the defendant was a substantial factor in producing the intrusion.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

Also known as “Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress”
 
When someone’s actions cause emotional or mental trauma to another, the victim may be able to recover damages for the mental distress. The stress can be caused by intentional, reckless or negligence conduct, but the tort of IIED requires the element of intent.
 
Click for the following case to consider, followed by a description of the elements of IIED:
 
  1. Elements of IIED in California (also used in the case above):
    1. [An act of] outrageous conduct by the defendant;
    2. The defendant's intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress;
    3. The plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
    4. [Defendant is the cause of this distress].
  1. Defining the Elements:
    1. Act: Voluntary movement of d’s body; could be words here.
    2. Extreme or outrageous conduct: Atrocious and totally intolerable behavior, enough to shock the conscience.
    3. Intent: Desire/knowledge with substantial certainty
    4. Severe emotional distress: Substantial mental anguish.
    5. Cause: But for/substantial factor.
    6.  
      If you would like another interesting IIED case to read (which is optional only), please try Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977), available at: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/431/254/2184260/

6.3 California Case Law and Other Sources on IIED

Sources and Authority

  • “A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050—1051 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 636, 209 P.3d 963])
  • “ ‘[I]t is generally held that there can be no recovery for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for insults, indignities or threats which are considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances.’ ” (Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128 [257 Cal.Rptr. 665], internal citations omitted.)
  • “It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903—904 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 820 P.2d 181].)
  • “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397 [89 Cal.Rptr. 78].)
  • “ ‘It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.’ ” (Fletcher, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at p. 397, internal citation omitted.)
  • “ ‘The law limits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant.’ The only exception to this rule is that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with reckless disregard of, the plaintiff and the probability that his or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress to that plaintiff. Where reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s interests is the theory of recovery, the presence of the plaintiff at the time the outrageous conduct occurs is recognized as the element establishing a higher degree of culpability which, in turn, justifies recovery of greater damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than allowed on a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 905—906, internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

  • 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 451—454
  • 4 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 44, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, § 44.01 (Matthew Bender)
  • 32 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 362, Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress, § 362.10 (Matthew Bender)
  • 15 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 153, Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress. § 153.20 et seq. (Matthew Bender)

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Week 7: Defenses to Intentional Torts


7.1 Overview

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to:
  • Describe the main defenses to intentional torts
  • Explain how these arguments can help a defendant escape liability

    Overview

    Defenses are arguments made by a defendant to counter a plaintiff's claim. You might recognize this concept from criminal law, where a murder charge may be addressed with a defense of insanity of self-defense. Here in Tort Law, there are legally recognized defenses as well, which should be raised affirmatively in the pleadings at the start of the case. Please watch my video in this module and consult the other materials there to learn more. There are a number of very short video clips that illustrate each defense quite well. And there is a quiz at the end of this module.

    7.2 Defenses to Intentional Torts: Case Law

    Introduction: If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case for battery, assault, false imprisonment, conversion, trespass to chattels, or trespass to land, the defendant can still escape liability by establishing one of several defenses. Normally, the defendant has the burden of proof on these defenses. We will examine two major defenses (Consent and Self-Defense/Defense of Others/Defense of Property), which are available for each of the six torts listed above. A third defense, Necessity, is used mainly to justify trespasses.

    Consent

    1. Consent is giving permission that an act or an invasion of an interest shall take place. (Definition from Restatement, Second, Torts, §10A.)
      1. Using the Defense: Consent can be used as a defense to a prima facie case, but it can also be used to negate the “offensiveness” of the touching (battery) and it can negate a confinement (false imprisonment). This may depend on the court, as some courts consider “unconsented” to be an element of intentional torts, while other courts will require a defendant to plead and prove consent as a defense.
      2. Example Cases (summaries)
        • Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979): “The question in this case is whether in a regular season professional football game an injury which is inflicted by one football player on an opposing player can give rise to liability in tort where the injury was inflicted by the intentional striking of a blow during the game.” During a game between the Cincinnati Bengals and Denver Broncos, Bengals’ offensive back Charles Clark inflicted a blow against Broncos’ defensive back Dale Hackbert. Hackbert had been kneeling on the sidelines, out of the game, when a frustrated and angry Clark walked by and hit him in the back of the head, breaking Hackbert’s neck. Clark’s blow was caught on film and he admitted that it was intentional.
          • The trial court held as a matter of law that football is a violent game, that such incidents are common, and that players give implied consent to the risk of injury by playing. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took note of the rules of professional football, which state that “All players are prohibited from striking on the head, face or neck with the heel, back or side of the hand, wrist, forearm, elbow, or clasped hands.” The appeals court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the allegation of intentional misconduct outside the parameters of the game (both the rules and the accepted customs) was enough to state a cause of action for an intentional tort. “We take the view that…plaintiff was entitled to have the case tried on an assessment of his rights and whether they had been violated.”
        • Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1996): Hogan (wife) and Tavzel (husband) were married for fifteen years but encountered marital problems which caused them to separate. During a period of attempted reconciliation in late 1989 and early 1990, Tavzel infected Hogan with a sexually transmitted disease. He knew of his condition but did not warn Hogan or take any precaution against infecting her. The parties were divorced in 1990 and Hogan later sued Tavzel for battery.
          • The trial court dismissed the battery count on the grounds that the sexual intercourse was consensual, and thus the offensive element of battery was not satisfied. The Florida appeals court, finding no case precedent in Florida for a similar claim, examined a California case which held that one party’s consent to sexual intercourse is invalidated by the partner’s fraudulent concealment of a risk of infection with venereal disease. The Florida court also looked to the Restatement of Torts, which suggested that one party infecting an unknowing partner with venereal disease should be liable for battery. The court agreed with these authorities, holding that Tavzel could be liable for battery. It reasoned that “Hogan’s consent, if without the knowledge that Tavzel was infected with a sexually transmitted disease, was the equivalent of no consent, and would not be a defense to the battery charge if proven.”

    Self-Defense/Defense of Others/Defense of Property

    1. Self-Defense is the protection of one’s person or property against some injury attempted by another. In Torts, as in Criminal Law, a person has a recognized privilege to use (or threaten to use) force to defend himself/herself against an attack. Defense of Others is an extension of this; the law also recognizes a person’s right to use (or threaten to use) force in defense of a person other than himself/herself.
    1. Using the Defense: Self-defense can be asserted as a privilege for conduct that would otherwise be considered a battery, assault, false imprisonment, IIED, conversion, trespass to chattels, or trespass to land. Self-defense can only be used to protect and resist an attack, not as retaliation
    Example case (summary)
    • Tatman v. Cordingly, 672 P.2d 1286 (Wy. 1983). There was a dispute between Tatman and Cordingly which precipitated a fight. Tatman was 66 years old at the time, while Cordingly was in his early 20’s. As a result of the fight, Tatman was hospitalized for eight days and incurred substantial medical expenses. There was evidence that Tatman had a bad temper, that he carried a gun and used it often, that he ran over Cordingly’s motorcycle with his pickup truck, that Tatman struck Cordingly first, that Tatman was repeatedly trying to grab his rifle, and that Cordingly feared for his life during the encounter.
      • The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict that Tatman committed a battery and Cordingly exercised reasonable self-defense. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court agreed, upholding the lower court’s judgment. It suggested that the person exercising self-defense must show that he/she acted under a reasonable belief that real danger exists, a standard that is both subjective and objective: “Not only must a person believe that real danger exists, but that belief also must be reasonable.”

    Defense of (Unoccupied) Property: Please read the case below.

    For Full Case, click here: Katko v. Briney183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971)
     
    Summary of the case as follows:

    Facts

    • Bertha Briney inherited an old farmhouse in Mahaska County, Iowa, which the Brineys had left vacant for the last ten years prior to the incident. The farmhouse was boarded up and "No Trespassing" signs were displayed around the property. The farmhouse was in poor condition and was subject to frequent burglaries and break-ins.
    • To defend the house against further intruders and theft, Edward Briney mounted a 20-gauge spring-loaded shotgun in the farmhouse and rigged it to fire when the north bedroom door was opened. Bertha suggested aiming the gun downward to shoot towards an intruder's legs, rather than cause a mortal injury. Edward Briney also covered the bedroom window with steel.
    • Marvin Katko worked regularly as a gasoline station attendant in Eddyville, seven miles from the Briney's farmhouse.
    • TIMELINE:
        1. In 1967 the area around the house was covered with high weeds, Katko had observed it for several years while hunting in the area and considered it as being abandoned.
        1. Prior to July 16, 1967, Katko and his friend Marvin McDonough had been to the premises and found several old bottles and fruit jars which they stole and added to their collection of antiques.
        1. On July 16, 1967, Katko and McDonough again entered the farmhouse with the intent of stealing more old bottles and dated fruit jars. Upon entering the bedroom, the shotgun fired into Katko’s right leg at point blank range where much of Katko's leg, including part of the tibia, was blown away. Katko was subsequently hospitalized for 40 days.

    Court Opinion

    The Court ruled that using deadly force on intruders in an unoccupied property was not reasonable or justified. Briney would have been justified in defending himself with the shotgun if he had been home during the intrusion. The plaintiff's status as a trespasser is irrelevant when assessing liability in this case.
    The case stands for the proposition that, although a landowner has no duty to make his property safe for trespassers, he may not set deadly traps against them, holding that "the law has always placed a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property." The court thus ruled for Katko, entering judgment for $20,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.

    Aftermath

    The case had several subsequent results.
    1. The Brineys sold 80 of their 120 acres to pay the judgment while proceeding with an appeal. Three of the Brineys’ neighbors bought the property at auction and entered into a leaseback arrangement with the Brineys after their appeal was denied but eventually one sold his share to his son for a profit. The Brineys and Katko then joined in a lawsuit against the neighbor to create a constructive trust on the profit, but the case was settled before trial in an amount sufficient to close out the judgment against the Brineys.
    1. As Katko's injury was misreported by the United Press International wire service as having taken place in the Briney residence, several states introduced what were called "Briney Bills" for self-defense, which was not at issue in the case. The Nebraska Legislature act, stating that "no person ... shall be placed in ... jeopardy ... for protecting, by any means necessary, himself, his family, or his real estate property", was overturned due to improper delegation of sentencing authority in State v. Goodseal (1971).[4]
    Four years after the case was decided, Edward Briney was asked if he would change anything about the situation. Briney replied, "There's one thing I'd do different, though: I'd have aimed that gun a few feet higher." Marvin Katko's own home was burgled in 1976, with burglars making off with several valuables. Katko would later end his own life on November 15, 1994, using a gun in the front yard of his home.

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